Australia's Constitution, Crown, and Future
By Rev. Kameel Majdali, Ph.D.
INTRODUCTION
Without question Australia is one of the unique countries of the world, perched at the edge of the Asia Pacific Region, with a unique history, striking landscape, dynamic population, and a promising future. Clearly since Federation, if not before, it has become a respected and attractive nation, a favoured haven for migrants from around the globe. "Prosperous," "stable," "successful" would be adjectives many people would ascribe to this nation.
During this time, however, there is a great sense of searching and unease. Like its sister nation Canada, Australia is looking for meaning in this post-industrial, post-modern, post-twentieth century world. What, many ask, does it mean to be Australian?
The push to establish an Australian republic is based, in part, on answering this question. A republic, we are told, will confirm and re-define our sense of nationhood at this transitional time in human history; not necessary a quest for democracy, which Australia clearly enjoys, but that of identity. Others are not so sure of the necessity of a republic or disagree with its proposed outcome.
By rights, I would make an ideal republican. I was born and raised in the most famous republic on earth, the United States of America. I am well versed in its history and why it broke from the British Crown in 1776. The closest thing to royalty I knew of in America was Hollywood and the Kennedys. Part of my major at university was in political science. I even voted "Republican" during U.S. elections.
After years of studying the issue, however, it is my conviction that converting this nation into a republic, especially with the model presented by the 1998 Constitutional Convention, is not in Australia's best interests. The changes such a conversion will bring are substantial and the proposed benefits so small as to be negligible; the risks, on the other hand, are unacceptably great.
The purpose of this paper is to examine our current system of constitutional monarchy, the proposed republican model, and what are the possible ramifications.
AUSTRALIA'S CONSTITUTION
Much of the attractiveness of Australia to the world community goes far beyond our cute koalas and kangaroos. It has to do with our political stability; a wonderful and rare phenomena in a world where political turmoil, rampant corruption, and/or civil strife plague all too many nations. Even the United States has suffered a civil war, race riots, Watergate, Iran-Contra, lengthy impeachment and supply crises; all these things are alien to Australia's way of life.
It is no mystery why Australia has been blessed in this manner. This nation has a written constitution with a remarkably effective set of checks and balances.
Constitutions are about the parameters of political power: how governments can make laws and properly enforce them, what authority and responsibility politicians have, and ensuring the right people safeguard a constitutionally sanctioned government. The Constitution is meant to be a permanent and fixed structure in the political landscape. It is not a political textbook, an almanac of rights, nor a wish list of special interest groups. Like the foundation of a building, constitutions are essential for the establishing the proper legal framework of a nation. Though subject to amendments (like a building is able to have extensions), Constitutions are meant to be left intact--especially if they are working properly. As Thomas Jefferson put it, "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes."
Australia has been a federation of six sovereign states since January 1, 1901. This union, or commonwealth, is governed by the Australian Constitution of 1901, a document that was approved by Australians in a voter referendum before federation. Our Constitution is a hybrid that has implemented components from several nations: the Westminster system from Britain, the bicameral parliament of the United States with a House of Representative and Senate , a Canadian-style federation, and the referendum concept of constitutional change from Switzerland (this is a rare privilege in a world where constitutions can usually be altered by the government of the day).
Effective as our Constitution has been in delivering political stability, such issues as the Prime Minister, Cabinet, fundamental freedoms, or even who is the head of state, are not even mentioned in the Constitution. Nor need they be. This is because an important part of our Constitution is the unwritten conventions. A "convention" is the unwritten and unenforceable habits or practices by which our system of government operates (WADDY 1998:17).
Evolution of the Australian Constitution came from many legal and constitutional battles and practices that occurred long before European settlement in 1788. After the first model parliament in England sat in 1295, a power struggle ensued between parliament and the monarch. After many centuries, a modus vivendi came into operation: namely, Parliament would be the law-maker and the Crown would be the "law-assenter." In addition, the Crown, as Bagehot masterfully put it, should be consulted, offer encouragement, and warn ministers. The Crown was to be absolutely neutral in political affairs yet duty-bound to act on the advice of the elected ministers.
One source of power held by the Crown which does not need ministerial advice, however, are the Reserved Powers. These powers can be used at the Crown's absolute discretion. This ingenious constitutional formula has a marvelous combination of balance of power, separation of power, and historical experience to ensure safe and stable government. Hence the Crown becomes the protector of the Constitution; indeed, some refer to it as the constitutional umpire. This formula, which has evolved over many centuries, has worked very, very well. Legally speaking, it is the reason this country has had an enviable track record of political stability. We will have more discussion on the reserve powers later in this essay.
Our Australian Constitution, which in essence consists of the document of 1901, the later amendments, the relevant parliamentary acts, and the aforementioned centuries of inherited conventions, has the right mix of parliamentary balance of power. Both the electorate and the Crown ensure that there are limitations on what the politicians can do.
To tamper with a good constitution is like playing around with the foundations of a building; it disturbed, it can send cracks up the building wall…or worse. A legal expert from Canada named Ian Holloway uses the term "Constitutionalism" to those who want to tamper with the symbolism and/or substance of a working constitution. According to Holloway, constitutionalism is a "fixation with the form, rather than the substance, of the terms of a country's constitution, and a desire to alter its form in a fundamental way without realising that this in fact is being done, and without paying heed to the consequences which will necessarily follow on the alteration " (HOLLOWAY 1998:14).
For all practical purposes, Referendum Day 1999 is when the voters of Australia will be asked to accept or reject nothing less than a major overhaul to the Constitution; why I call this an overhaul rather than minimal change others suggest, will be outlined shortly. Yet we face this Referendum with a constitutionally uninformed citizenry. According to the 1988 Constitutional Commission, 50% of respondents were not even sure Australia had a constitution and 82% were unaware of its contents (ABBOTT 1997:3). Educating the electorate in such a short time will be challenging enough indeed.
Holloway adds, " Once a constitution is opened up, especially in a rights conscious society, it becomes a Pandora's box" (HOLLOWAY 1998:23). The example of the Quebec's prospective exit from the Canadian federation has been aided by Canada's flirtation with constitutionalism. Now Australians are being asked to change a Constitution, which has delivered stable government for a century. Holloway gives this final warning, "But in light of the Canadian experience, any dispassionate observer would urge Australians to think long and hard before viewing a change to the Constitution as the key to national rejuvenation (HOLLOWAY 1998:24).
THE ROLE OF THE CROWN IN AUSTRALIA'S CONSTITUTION
Preamble. "Whereas the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby established."
While it may not be well known or understood, the centerpiece of the Australian Constitution is the Crown. Consider for a moment the frequency of references to the crown and monarchy in the Constitution: the word "Queen" is mentioned thirty-nine times, the words "Her Majesty" eleven times, and the words "the Crown" four times. All this terminology can be safely wrapped into one phrase, "the Crown," since the constitutional emphasis is on the principle of the Crown, not the actual person who wears it. Abbott says that the Australian Founding Fathers were not enamored with the human personality of the Queen, because the charismatic personal Crown of the Middle Ages had long given way to the dignified Crown recognized by Bagehot as the embodiment of people and state (ABBOTT 1997:9).
It is the Crown that stands as the common denominator of the six states in the Australian federation. As the quintessence of the people, the nation, and all aspects of government, the Crown also represents continuity, civilization, culture, and even Judeo-Christianity (note the reference to "Almighty God" in the preamble or study the coronation ceremony and oath). The Crown is above politics and unlike politicians, who represent their party, constituency, or special interest group, the Crown is empowered and duty-bound to represent everyone. As such, it is uniquely qualified to symbolize the unity of the states, the people, and the nation as a whole, something that politicians are rarely able to do.
Australia possesses what is called a "constitutional monarchy." This is in distinction to an absolute monarchy, where the sovereign can do what he wants when he wants. In a constitutional monarchy, the powers of the sovereign are strictly limited to the Constitution and conventions. Geoffrey White defines constitutional monarchy as "…a state where the people through parliament are sovereign, but where the monarchy represents that sovereignty and who is ceremonial Head of State. The monarch enjoys position by consent of the people, either through Acts of Parliament or a written constitution" (WHITE 1997:46).
According to the Constitution, the "Crown" is represented by the person of Elizabeth II, whose legal status is Queen of Australia. It is important to note what she does not do: the Queen does not run the country nor does she (or the British government) tell the Australian government what to do. She cannot even visit this country except by invitation. Elizabeth II serves as a symbol of our constitutional arrangements, where the apex of power is beyond politics, and to whom politicians must in theory submit and account (a healthy concept in an aggressive, ambitious world). The Queen's sole constitutional function is to appoint Australia's Governor-General on the recommendation of the Australian Prime Minister, a function she performs approximately every five years.
THE CROWN AND THE RESERVE POWERS
A crucial component of the Crown and its ability to maintain national stability is the existence of the previously mentioned "reserve powers." These conventions are binding, even though they are not rules of law or even written down. It is the reserved powers, exercised only by the monarch or vice-regal representative that deliver the checks and balances necessary for constitutional and national stability. Former Chief Justice Sir Harry Gibbs points out "Since the conventions have developed in relation to the Monarch and the representatives of the Monarch, they have no necessary application to a republican system" (GIBBS 1997:8-9). White says that the existence of these powers ensures the continuance of the nation's principles and institutions (WHITE 1997:51). What would happen to these very real but uncodified powers in a republican Australia? It is a question we still await sound answers from proponents of a republic.
Like the heavy-duty emergency brake on a runaway vehicle, the reserve powers are only to be used when the prime minister and the government of the day are no longer entitled to remain in office. Under normal circumstances, the Crown is obliged to take the advice of the Prime Minister as long as his political legitimacy is intact. If, however, the Prime Minister is loses a vote of no confidence and refuses to resign, or cannot obtain passage of a budget and fails to relinquish office, then the Crown can exercise the reserve powers.
The most famous example of the use of reserve powers was the dismissal of the Whitlam Labour Government in November 1975. While considered a controversial move, the facts are that this constitutional crisis ended quickly and peacefully. There were no riots in the street, no political assassinations, and no long-term ill effects. Try lamenting about this incident to the Americans, who had just recovered from over two draining years of Watergate, and one can see that the safety switch for democracy was operational, successful, and swift. Let us not forget that the ultimate arbiters of the crisis were Australian voters in the federal election that followed, and they upheld the Governor-General's decision.
Part of the Australian genius has been in the nation's ability to "adapt" to hostile terrain or mold outside institutions into something uniquely Australian. The English language, Christmas, rugby, soccer, and cricket, are Australian institutions even though they originated elsewhere. The same applies to the Crown. The Statue of Westminster (1931) marked a watershed between Australia and the Crown. In essence, the Crown "of Great Britain and Ireland" had become the "Crown of Australia." Even though our monarch happens to be monarch in Britain, Canada, New Zealand, PNG, and other realms, she is Australia's monarch as far as the constitution is concerned. The Statue of Westminster, along with the Royal Style and Titles Acts of 1953 and 1973, brought about significant constitutional evolution. While none of the words of the 1901 Constitution changed, the Crown in Australia has. To use the words of Sydney University Professor Patrick Lane, "The Australianisation of the Crown is now complete…" (The Australian 29/9/94).
From historical evolution and experience, it has been proven that a well-balanced structure of checks and balances, with the apex of power being apolitical (as well as the judiciary), gives the best assurance of national stability. It is precisely this formulation that has helped Australia become the success story that it is. The Crown's greatest purpose is not by wielding power but through denying absolute power to all other branches of government, be it the legislative, judiciary, or the military. Abbott stunningly puts it this way: "In (apartheid) South Africa and in (republican) Fiji, the establishment of a republic gave freer rein to the enemies of freedom-not because the Queen was herself defending Indian shopkeepers or the residents of black townships, but because the existence of the Crown denied complete power to politicians. The Crown achieves its object simply by existing. The Crown does not need to act-it simply needs to be (ABBOTT 1995:74).
To summarize, the purpose of the Crown in Australia's constitution is to separate all aspects of government, corporately and individually, and holding a position of titular superiority over all branches of government, though not in day-to-day power. The real power belongs to the Parliament. The Crown can use the reserve powers as a last resort to intervene in a stalled political system in order to maintain democracy and stable government. At all times and in all ways, the Crown represents all the people and the entire nation, and serves as a conduit and symbol of our heritage, history, culture, civilization, and religion.
THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
Because the monarch is a non-resident, the Constitution makes provision for the exercise of her power through section 61, which reads "The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and the laws of the Commonwealth." The Governor-General is a distinguished Australian and is appointed by the Queen on recommendation of the Australian Prime Minister (he can also be removed by the Queen on advice of the Prime Minister, though this has not happened). For all practical purposes, the Prime Minister nominates and the Queen, who always acts on advice of her ministers, "countersigns" the nomination. While the appointment process may seem a needless formality, in reality it serves a very significant purpose. By sending the appointment to the Queen, the nomination of the Governor-General becomes filtered by the Crown and denuded of its partisanship. The result is a head of state that remains above politics and must scrupulously guard the Constitution. It also gives dignity to the office and legal legitimacy in fulfilling constitutional functions and exercising the reserve powers.
In true adaptable, egalitarian, and Australian style, the Governor-General, though a commoner, has a truly vice-regal role. In other words, he can be "king for a day." As the Crown's representative in Australia, this is not to imply that the Governor-General is in some way subservient or under orders of the Queen. Basically, as a representative of the Crown, the Governor-General does everything the Queen would do if she lived in Australia. He does not take directives or instructions from the Queen (or the British government) in any manner; instead, he is free to act according to the parameters outlined in our federal Constitution and also by the conventions, or reserved powers. Interestingly, the Governor-General can continue to exercise executive powers in his own right, even on those occasions when the Queen is present in Australia. During the constitutional crisis of 1975, Buckingham Palace commented "…the Australian Constitution firmly places the prerogative powers of the Crown in the hands of the Govenor-General …The Queen has no part in the decisions which the Governor-General must take into accordance with the Constitution…" (SMITH 1997:7).
Constitutionally, the Governor-General exercises considerable powers: he signs bills into law that were passed by Parliament, summons and dissolves Parliament, appoints ministers, issues writs for general elections, submits proposals for referendums, recommending appropriations, making proclamations, creating government appointments, making statutory appointments, and commands the armed forces (everything the monarch would do). He can and does represent Australia overseas. Yet because he represents a higher, pervasive, apolitical power, namely the Crown, it keeps the Governor-General as an accountable, non-dictatorial, and impartial umpire of the Australian constitution.
AN AUSTRALIAN HEAD OF STATE?
"Do you-or don't you-want an Australian head of state?" former Prime Minister Paul Keating asked then Opposition leader John Howard in federal parliament. Keating's question managed to distill the multi-faceted arguments for an Australian republic into a powerful and emotional war cry. The implication of this question is simple: Australia lacks its own head of state and when one is created, we will discover the secret of national revival. In practical terms, the adoption of the republican agenda means removing the Queen, or Crown, from our Constitution and replacing it with the office of President. "A resident for President" has become catchy slogan meant to win over the Australian electorate to a republic.
What is a "Head of State?" It is a term that is used out of diplomacy rather than point of law. Often, it merely signifies who is entitled to a twenty-one gun salute. Some heads of state exercise their powers ceremonially while other countries, most notably the United States, have heads of state (the president) who exercise executive powers. As Abbott puts it, some heads of state are team captains; others are umpires (ABBOTT 1997:62).
Heads of State command armed forces, sign bills into law, appoint ministers, summon and prorogue legislatures. As mentioned above, these are the functions of the Australian Governor-General. The Commonwealth Government Directory-The Official Guide" of December 1995 to February 1996 (written during Keating's time) defines the role of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief as "He is the Head of State in whom power of the Commonwealth is vested." The Australian newspaper, well-known for its strong republican sentiments, used the term Australia's "Head of State" to describe the Governor-General (23 June 1995, 24-25 June 1995). The same paper specifically referred Governor-General Sir William Deane as Head of State (6 September 1996).
So why are we told that we need an Australian head of state when we already have a distinguished Australian fulfilling all the functions of a normal head of state? How is it that the Governor-General is not considered by republicans to be an Australian Head of State, when a proposed President, who has exactly the same functions, powers, and prerogatives of the Governor-General, would be considered Head of State? We still await a proper explanation to such logic.
Sir David Smith, who served as secretary to five governors-general, made this statement: "Foremost among the reasons given for constitutional change is the claim that the republic will give us an Australian Head of State. This claim is as mischievous as it is dishonest. Its success is dependent on the notorious ignorance of the vast majority of Australians about their Constitution. The truth is that Australia has two Heads of State. The Queen is our symbolic Head of State, the Govenor-General is our constitutional Head of State, and we have had Australians in the office of Governor-General since Lord Casey's appointment in 1965" (SMITH 1997:2).
MODERN AUSTRALIAN REPUBLICANISM
The word "republic" comes from the Latin term res publica meaning "the public thing." In a democracy, it can be summarized as "a state where sovereignty resides in the people who delegate their power to their elected representatives." Another way of putting it is where there is a political (elected), non-hereditary head of state. In our time the term "republic" can be used for democracies, dictatorships, and one-party states alike. While most nations on earth are republics, there is nothing superior or more desirable with that form of government than a constitutional monarchy. It is not a promotion or a step towards further national maturity to adopt republicanism-a look at the political and social problems of many of the world's republics makes this clear.
Despite the stability and benefits of Australia's constitutional monarchy, republicanism has made great strides during the 1990's. The Australian Labour Party made part of the 1991 platform the goal of establishing an Australian republic by 2001, the centenary of federation. Also in 1991, Malcolm Turnbull, Thomas Keneally, David Hill, Neville Wran, the Hon Franca Arena MLC, and others formed the Australian Republican Movement (ARM). Republicanism in Australian received a big boost through the patronage of then Prime Minister Paul Keating, who in 1993 appointed Turnbull as chairman of the Republican Advisory Committee, with a government grant of $600,000. Some have called the ARM an elitist group lacking in grassroots support, whose membership was often half that of the Australians for Constitutional Monarchy. Nor can they claim to represent the views of all republicans. But the ARM has succeeded to get republicanism onto the national agenda, culminating in the Constitutional Convention of February 1998 and the Referendum of November 1999. In addition to the Australian Labour Party, a republic is backed by labour unions and the Australian media. Some prominent liberal politicians, perhaps to undergo a makeover into a "progressive" and "forward-looking" leader, have switched from advocating the status quo to support a republic.
Reasons given for a republic have included the need to assert our full independence from Great Britain, to rid ourselves of a foreign queen so we can have a resident for president, to help bolster the economy, to aid in Aboriginal reconciliation, to help non-English migrants feel more at home, to help stimulate artistic creativity by breaking the psychological control from Britain, to give us a sense of national pride, and the most famous reason of all, "a republic is inevitable." Andrew Robb, of "Conservatives for an Australian Head of State" says "A stable, peaceful, confident country needs a cultural figurehead. A person who reigns for the people, but who is above politics, can engender, a great spirit of unity, pride, and purpose in a nation. Today that role can only be filled by an Australian Head of State. To delay is to deny the great benefits that would follow" (ROBB 1997). It is not overtly clear what these benefits would be. Robb assiduously avoids using the term "republic" while calling those who are anti-republic "opponents of an Australian head of state." All sounds interesting but is it true and is it right?
THE REFERENDUM PROPOSAL SUMMARISED
While there are good, sensible refutations to the above republican arguments, it is best to focus on the specific referendum proposal at hand. The Constitutional Convention of 1998 recommended a republic with a parliamentary-elected president. It consists of the following components:
1. A committee of thirty-two people-sixteen community representatives appointed by the Prime Minister and sixteen federal and state parliamentarians-will provide the Prime Minister with a short lists of presidential candidates (there is no mechanism to force the Prime Minister to choose anyone on the short list).
2. The Prime Minster would nominate and the Leader of the Opposition second the nomination of President.
3. The nomination must be approved by two-thirds of Parliament.
4. The President would retain the reserve powers.
To remove the President:
1. The Prime Minister can dismiss the President at any time, without warning or reason.
2. The Prime Minister would need the endorsement of the House of Representatives, not the Senate, within thirty days of dismissal.
3. In the unlikely event that the House did not ratify the Prime Minister's decision, the result would not be treated as a vote of no confidence and the President would not be re-instated.
4. Apart from this, there appears to be no procedure to impeach the President.
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SUCCESSFUL REFERENDUM?
The intended purpose of many delegates to the Constitutional Convention was to provide for an Australian Head of State who is apolitical and with minimal change to the Constitution. How successful is the above referendum proposal for meeting these outcomes?
First, the changes to our present Constitution would be enormous. In the "Exposure Draft of the Constitution Alteration (Establishment of Republic 1999), from pages 30 to 44 are some forty-three highlighted items slated for amendment, alteration, and/or deletion from the Constitution. Some are merely the substitution of a word or phrase, while in other cases, whole sections are removed. Remember, there are fifty-four direct references to Queen, Crown, or HM spread throughout the Constitution and every one of them will have to be removed. Never in this nation's history of referenda have the Australian electorate been asked to approve so many changes to our Constitution.
Second, will a successful referendum deliver us an apolitical president? It is correct that the nominee for president must not belong to a political party, though it is not stated how long one must have departed from a party in order to qualify. Regarding the "political-ness" of the President, he or she will invariably subscribe to the political process because:
a) Half of the nominating committee will be politicians;
b) The actual nomination and seconding process will be by politicians;
c) The approval of the president will be by politicians, namely two-thirds of both houses of Parliament. This is a very high percentage for bi-partisan support and will probably result in "wheeling and dealing" in order to achieve election. What eminent Australian of the calibre of our current Governors-General would subject themselves to such political horse-trading in order to perform with distinction the duties now exercisable out of Yarralumla?
d) The President can be arbitrarily dismissed by a politician, the Prime Minister, rather than an apolitical monarch, who is restrained by convention and the Constitution? Dismissal is a rare but necessary "safety switch" or "insurance policy" for democracy, but if poorly executed can be damaging for the political process. The proposed process cannot prevent a politically-motivated (rather than principle-centred) dismissal of the President by the Prime Minister.
e) Technically speaking, the President does not replace the Queen; he replaces the Governor-General. The Queen, as appointer of the Head of State, is replaced by our federal politicians. The result is the politicization of the Head of State role and a significant power-shift in favour of the Prime Minister and Parliament.
As you can see, the referendum proposal fails on both counts to avoid major changes to the Constitution or to installation of a political president.
WHAT DO REPUBLICANS HAVE TO SAY?
Consider the following quotes from republicans about the Convention model and the referendum proposal for a republic:
"The Convention's model is flawed…. Its presidential removal mechanism is both structurally unsound and entirely inappropriate."-Prof. George Winterton (1998:7).
"…the model is significantly flawed…" and "…the Convention conclusions are flawed because, at least in one respect, they are unworkable" - Prof. Cheryl Saunders (1998:11).
"…Why are we to assume that a joint sitting of the two Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament will produce the two-thirds majority necessary to appoint a President? What will happen if this does not occur" and "…it is a weak model, with a number of serious deficiencies"-Prof. Greg Craven (1998:19,20).
"The model does not prevent a politically motivated dismissal of a President" and "At a time of constitutional crisis it would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain bipartisan support for a candidate"-Linda Kirk (1998:21).
"The ARM-preferred model is unsatisfactory, and voting that it should go to a referendum was a compromise we endorsed only after our efforts to widen the debate failed…" -Moira Rayner (1998:30).
"It's going to make the biggest structural change (since Federation) to our Constitution"-Thomas Keneally, TCN9 Nightline (18/1/1999)
"…(the Prime Minister) becomes the absolute executive power. If you think about history the greatest dangers to humanity historically have always been from the executive: dictators or over mighty parliamentarians"---ARM Patron, Democrat Senator Andrew Murray ABC AM (11/3/1999).
"The most ridiculous constitutional alteration proposal I have ever heard of…no other republic has such an arrangement…no other country has been so misguided as to adopt such an obviously unbalanced arrangement" Hc/misc/12280 10 June 1999 -- Republican Mr. Harry Evans', clerk of the Senate and Australia's most senior parliamentary officer, description of the referendum proposal.
OTHER ISSUES AND SUMMARY
Other considerations include keeping the reserve powers as is, uncodified and potentially powerful. Since they derive their legitimacy from the constitutional monarchy, how will they preserve our checks and balances in a republic? How can we have a "business as usual" approach to government, maintain healthy governmental restraint, and prevent abuse of power, if there is no Crown to maintain the potency of the reserve powers in its own right?
Then there is the question of the states. Each state is a constitutional monarchy, with a premier-nominated, crown-appointed governor; these states are federated also under the constitutional monarchy. If the basis (shall we call it glue or binder) of the indissoluble commonwealth is the Crown and Constitution, what will happen if the Crown is removed, thus automatically and dramatically altering our Constitution? Will the federation remain indissoluble? What if one or two states dissent from supporting the republican referendum? Can they still remain constitutional monarchies in a republican Australia (a constitutional monstrosity, to say the least)?
Many questions arise with too few answers. The fact is that a successful referendum will necessitate additional constitutional conventions "to iron out the wrinkles." The up-front of the current republic push has been $45 million for the convention, perhaps $50 for the referendum. What will these future conventions and other items (changing titles, crests, currencies, etc.) cost just to give us what we already have? While some republicans only want ultra-minimal change, others have bigger agendas. Once we enter into Holloway's constitutionalism, where do we draw the line in order to preserve the unity and sanctity of the nation? Which branch of republicanism, the minimalists or the maximalists, will prevail on the great constitutional battlefield? And what will we gain of lasting value and benefit for Australia for all the bother and cost this republic entails?
In conclusion, Australia has been blessed with a wisely crafted Constitution that has delivered political stability for a century. It was built to last and is meant to last. No republican proposal given thus far can guarantee the outcomes we presently enjoy. The adoption of the republican referendum will greatly change our constitution as we know it, remove a familiar and trustworthy institution of the Crown and Governor-General, giving us a President who is a politician in all but name, and other political outcomes which are uncertain at best (though one certainty will be more power for the Prime Minister and Parliament). Furthermore, a republic will not create one job, make Australia any more independent than it is, instill national unity (indeed it has brought disunity, first among monarchists and republicans, now also between ARM republicans and direct-election republicans), eliminate public hospital queues, reduce accidental death by drugs, or any other domestic or international consideration. Referendum 1999 will determine whether 1 January 2001 becomes the day we celebrate the one-hundredth birthday of our Australian Constitution or witness its dismemberment. As Holloway advises, let us "think long and hard" before we jettison such a national treasure.
Rev. Kameel Majdali, Ph.D. (MELB) is Principal of Harvest Bible College in Melbourne and regularly travels and writes about world affairs.
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